Sense of Community, a Pathway to or Bridge from Alienation? 

By David W. McMillan, Fisk University, Nashville, TN 
Raymond P. Lorion, Towson University, Towson, MD 

Abstract: Psychological Sense of Community (PSOC) represents a formative conceptual offering of Community Psychology to the social sciences. Nearly five decades ago, PSOC offered a window into the influence of ecological factors to understanding the emotional and behavioral well-being of members of disenfranchised and underserved segments of the population, especially members of minority and low-income subgroups. Our discipline’s founders viewed PSOC as one promising vehicle for pursuing the desired paradigmatic shift from individual to systemically focused interventions to achieve intended outcomes of the emerging community mental health movement. This Commentary reflects the authors’ shared thoughts to the adoption of PSOC by conservative spokespersons to explain the resistance of some to the diversification of the population and growing voice of progressive advocates. 

Overview: This commentary represents an unplanned but, in our view, necessary response to comments by some conservative voices who have adopted Psychological Sense of Community (PSOC) as justification for their positions on parochialism, tribalism, and calls for nationalists to join together to preserve their country’s racial identity. In response to decades of change in the racial, ethnic and cultural topography of populations across the globe and especially within the U.S., these voices argue for resisting and, insofar as possible, reversing racial integration, the entry of non-English-speaking immigrants and the valuing of differences and diversity. Some conservative spokespersons fear and resist impending alterations in their political influence and control. Listening to such discussions, especially when seemingly grounded in a conceptual foundation of our discipline (PSOC), catalyzed a discussion between the authors reflected in this commentary. Initially, we shared a mutual sense of “how dare they” apply PSOC to a world- view in direct opposition to Community Psychology’s seminal principles? As our discussion moved from umbrage to reflection, it evolved into examination of the breadth of PSOC’s applicability specifically and the very nature of “community” generally. What follows represents our thoughts on these issues that we hope will encourage further collegial discussion and debate. We prepared this essay in a hybrid form that is hopefully both personal and scholarly as a response to these bewildering threats to our society. We hope you will join us in this conversation as we attempt to apply our scholarship and expertise in the study of communities to this current world.

PSOC’s conceptual and empirical foundations: Community psychology emerged early in the 1960s in response to legislative intents that the Community Mental Health Center movement design and deliver acceptable, accessible and responsive mental health services to low-income and minority populations (Lorion, 1973, 1974). Our discipline’s initial goals included identifying, understanding and ameliorating ecological factors within communities contributing to emotional and behavioral disorders. By identifying etiological factors leading to dysfunction, the discipline’s founders sought to design and apply secondary interventions to interrupt pathogenetic processes early or primary prevention solutions to avoid them entirely. Among those founders, Sarason (1974) argued for community psychology to focus less on alienation, pathology and what is wrong within communities and instead on “Sense of Community” as an antidote to disorder and disenfranchisement. Referring to Cowen’s (1973) review of the

discipline’s emerging literature, Sarason noted:

“As I read this literature, however, there is one theme not always articulated clearly, which runs through it: the most important criterion by which to judge these efforts is whether they have produced or sustained a more positive psychological sense of community. Whether it be a headstart program, a neighborhood council, schools, senior citizens, drug abuse programs, or any of a score of community settings in which the community psychologist has found himself, his goal has been to create the conditions in which people can experience a sense of community that permits a productive compromise between the needs of individuals and the achievement of group goals.” (Sarason, 1974, p. 155)

In Sarason’s view, the challenge confronting Community Psychology was not to transfer clinical psychology’s emphasis on repairing individual pathology or problems in living to repairing problems in communities. Instead, for Sarason, the challenge was for the discipline to influence the shaping of settings be they classrooms, places of worship or neighborhoods such that by their very nature they promote health and foster positive life-span development. Sarason viewed community mental health as referring not to the location of service delivery but rather to its target! In his view, community psychology’s focus should be on the ecological characteristics of the settings in which people are raised, work and live. When engaged in settings supporting individuals with mental deficiencies, Sarason (1949) argued not for more such settings but rather for supporting such individuals to function in mainstream classrooms, appropriate occupational settings and situations and for the general acceptance of all forms of diversity (Sarason, 1988) across and within communities. In arguing for the centrality of PSOC to daily living, Sarason countered criticisms of its limitations as a non-precise, value-laden, “soft’ concept with:

“some of its {PSOC} characteristics are not hard to state. The perception of similarity to others, an acknowledged interdependence with others, a willingness to maintain this interdependence by giving or doing for others what one expects from them, the feeling that one is part of a larger dependable and stable structure – these are some of the ingredients of the psychological sense of community. You know when you have it and when you don’t. It is not without conflict or changes in its strength. It is at its height when the existence of the referent group is challenged by external events, by a crisis like the air war over London in 1940, or a catastrophe like an earthquake; it is also at its height, for shorter periods, in times of celebration, during a political victory party or an Easter mass. It is one of the major bases for self-definition and the judging of external events. The psychological sense of community is not a mystery to the person who experiences it. It is a mystery to those who do not experience it but hunger for it.” (p. 157)

From the outset, Sarason (1974) acknowledged that PSOC, like “love,” had such ineffable and spiritual qualities that it could not be operationally defined and measured but it and its effects could be studied. Sharing this view of PSOC, others accepted the term as face valid and conducted research with PSOC as a construct (e.g. Riger, et al, 1981; Ahlbrant & Cunningham, 1979; Bachrach & Zantra, 1985; Kascarda & Janowitz, 1974; and Rhoades,1982). Yet others, led in part by the efforts of the senior author, worked to define and measure PSOC (e.g. Doolittle & MacDonald, 1978; Glynn, 1981; McMillan, 1996; McMillan, 1976; McMillan & Chavis, 1976, 1986). 

McMillan’s description of his initial forays into the challenges of operationalizing PSOC informed the authors’ examination of PSOC as an essential element of understanding the lives of those segments of the population (e.g. low-income and minority populations in urban neighborhoods) who have historically been disenfranchised and those (e.g. low-skilled white residents in rural communities) who perceive their economic and cultural worlds eroding through the combined effects of growing demographic diversity and evolving progressive values.

Through our ongoing and, at times, admittedly heated discussions, we arrived at a shared view that understanding the conservative perspective may lead to respectful constructive discourse and, ideally, discovery of common ground. As McMillan explained to his co-author:

“in 1974 I began thinking of my idyllic small-town hometown, Arkadelphia, Arkansas (two colleges, 10,000 people, one hundred in my high school graduating class, thirty-five of my relatives within a two-block radius) as a model of PSOC. With guidance from Larry Wrightsman and J.R. Newbrough, I explored the group cohesiveness literature and discovered approximately twenty-four sub-elements, six within each of the four elements. I presented this theory in my major area paper (McMillan, 1976) and later published it (McMillan and Chavis, 1986).”

The McMillan and Chavis (1986) paper was central to a special issue of the Journal of Community Psychology (1986) focused on PSOC and has been cited in more than 5,000 articles on PSOC’s four dimensional structure. Scale development work on two measures of these PSOC dimensions, i.e. a short eight-item scale ((Peterson, et al, 2008) and a seventy-plus item scale (Chavis et al, 1986) have met psychometric criteria for reliability and validity. Each has provided operational grounding for significant bodies of research.; the brief scale has been used successfully in hundreds of studies nationally and globally. That body of work exemplifies the salience of PSOC to the discipline’s foundational base! 

Returning to our pre-commentary discussion, McMillan described to the co-author how he grew up in largely racist southwest Arkansas and believed that dark skin meant inferior. He explained that until he entered college, he never questioned local and generally negative stereotypes about “Black People.” Recognizing the intelligence, sophistication and shared world-views of minority students in his college, however, changed his perspective. From that point on, he described his ignorance and racial assumptions as melting away. Even now, however, he acknowledges kinship with white supremacists’ commitment to love and respect parents and earlier generations (who likely held racist views). They, like many of us, long for the simplicity of childhood and wish to preserve past or quickly fading communities, mental maps and ways of life.

These reflections led the authors to reflect on the seeming adoption of PSOC by conservative right-wing advocates as a reaction to rapidly emerging cultural and political changes. We appreciated that the fear of change is a widely shared experience. We recognized the desire to hold on to a long familiar but rapidly evaporating world. We understood that conservatives want their present community to remain firmly grounded in the past. Yet, their efforts to protect against alienation widens the gap between then and now! By preserving the values and traditions of their parents and earlier generations and resisting the tide of cultural change they become more alienated from current realities. Attempts to hold on to earlier times through appeals to PSOC can neither be dismissed nor ignored.

In Righteous Mind, Jonathan Haidt (2013) attempts to bridge the chasm between the political left and right. His thoughtful analysis identified six communal values that humans weave into their moral foundation of their political/communal decisions. They are:

1.     Care/Harm: “The Care/harm foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of caring for vulnerable children. It makes us sensitive to signs of suffering and need; it

makes us despise cruelty and want to care for those who are suffering,” (page 178).

2.     Fairness/Cheating: “The Fairness/cheating foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of reaping the rewards of cooperation without getting exploited. It makes us sensitive to indications that another person is likely to be a good (or bad) partner for collaboration and reciprocal altruism. It makes us want to shun or punish cheaters,” (page 178).

3.     Loyalty/Betrayal: “The Loyalty/betrayal foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of forming and maintaining coalitions. It makes us sensitive to signs that another person is (or is not) a team player. It makes us trust and reward such people, and it makes us want to hurt, ostracize, or even kill those who betray us or our group,” (pages 178-179).

4.     Authority/Subversion: “The Authority/subversion foundation evolved in response to the adaptive challenge of forging relationships that will benefit us within social hierarchies. It makes us sensitive to signs of rank or status, and to signs that other people are (or are not) behaving properly, given their position,” (page 179).

5.     Sanctity/Degradation: “The Sanctity/degradation foundation evolved initially in response to the adaptive challenge of the omnivore’s dilemma, and then to the broader challenge of living in a world of pathogens and parasites. It includes the behavioral immune system, which can make us wary of a diverse array of symbolic objects and threats. It makes it possible for people to invest objects with irrational and extreme values–both positive and negative–which are important for binding groups together,” (page 179).

6.     Liberty/Oppression: This element comes from splitting the Fairness/Cheating element into two parts. One which emphasizes what the value of karma, represented by the Hindu religious tradition and the Protestant work ethic. This value stresses that people should get what’s coming to them. Once split, this notion remains closet to the Fairness/Cheating element. The other part that is now assigned to the Liberty/Oppression element is reciprocity aspect of fairness more closely related to the value of equality.

The Liberty/Oppression value acknowledges Boehm’s (Hierarchy in the Forest, (1999)) that people have a genetic tendency to create hierarchies. Consequently humans, along with chimpanzees have developed an ability to manage Alpha’s, “to unite in order to shame, ostracize or kill anyone,” (page 199) any alpha that abused their position. “The Liberty foundation obviously operates in tension with the Authority foundation,” (page 301). “…This is not fairness. This is Boehm’s political transition and reverse dominance.” This is a key principle among people who identify as libertarians. It is the “urge to band together to oppose oppression and replace it with political equality,” (page 203).

Haidt distinguished the differences in the political values of liberals and conservatives this way: “Liberals have a three-foundation morality; whereas conservatives use six. Liberal moral matrices rest on Care/Harm (mostly), Liberty/Oppression, and Fairness/Cheating foundations, although liberals are often willing to trade away fairness (as proportionality) when it conflicts with compassion or with the right to fight oppression. Conservative morality rests on all six foundations, although conservatives are more willing than liberals to sacrifice Care and let some people get hurt in order to achieve their many other moral objectives,” page 214.

 

We respectfully disagree. We suggest that liberals widen their definition of community beyond national boundaries. Their communal frame of reference includes the human community and for some it includes all life on the planet. With an expansive definition of community, liberals use and respect the remaining three values as do conservatives. In our view, they just apply them more widely. As to Loyalty/Betrayal, liberals too yearn to be part of a team where members have roles and they too expect loyalty to the task and the authority structure of their team. The difference is that liberals view of eligible team members is more inclusive than conservatives.

As to Authority/Subversion, liberals respect and protect an authority structure which encourages equal opportunity and freedom of expression. Liberals respect authorities who serve justice and who respect all people equally. They support an authority structure that allows for an orderly change of power, a structure in which rank and office belong to the community and not a person. They oppose people who use the power of a public or community power for personal gain. 

As to Sanctity/Degradation, liberals have sacred stories. They have their pantheon of heroes, their sacred symbols, their treasured rituals, their honored tradition. In the U.S., Inauguration Day is a sacred day filled with important symbols, rituals and traditions. Their sacred heroes risked life and limb for the Enlightenment values Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. They include Nelson Mandela, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Martin Luther King. Liberals sense of disgust is stimulated by injustice and misplaced righteousness.

Haidt’s discussion and conclusions about liberals and conservative values does a better job at challenging liberal righteousness than we do. And we agree that liberal righteousness must be challenged. He is correct to suggest that communities which serve conservative parochial values as they build their PSOC are serving the values that all of humanity should respect and serve. He is right to say that in their opposition, the Left and the Right should recognize that their opponents, too, are people serving their communities according to their principles.

Though we agree that liberals and conservatives should find ways to see one another as opponents worthy of respect and compassion, we do not believe that liberals should be defined as serving only three of the six values in Haidt’s moral foundation. Liberals should not be ashamed of their attempts to expand “Community” beyond national boundaries, language barriers and skin color. Liberals need not abandon their Enlightenment values if Liberty, Equality and Fraternity just to make sure we don’t offend our conservative friends. But liberals should find room in their hearts for people who disagree with them.

With Haidt the authors challenge community psychologists to move beyond its discipline’s myopic focus on power. We suggest that while all communities include a power dimension, it is not the only important leg forming the foundation of a community. Community psychologists have, like Haidt, searched for a community’s moral compass. Nowell and Boyd’s article (2010), Viewing Community as a Responsibility as Well as a Resource was one attempt. They argued that promoting PSOC was part of the moral duty of a community. They opined that PSOC was a force for good. 

This assumption, McMillan explained, was challenged earlier by Brodsky’s (1996) study of single mothers in risky neighborhoods. She observed that residents reporting high levels of PSOC in troubled housing projects had low levels of general well-being; those with higher general well-being scores (psychological health) had lower PSOC scores. Seemingly, higher levels of self-reported psychological health were negatively associated with attachment to their neighborhood as measured by PSOC. Brodsky’s findings implied that PSOC represents not merely external characteristics of a community but the fit between people and their environment. PSOC from this perspective is not inherently positive or negative but rather a reflection of attachment to characteristics and individual reflections of self-defined communities.

In response to Nowell and Boyd’s article Viewing Community as a Responsibility as Well as a Resource (2010), McMillan (2011) proposed that PSOC was a neutral moral force, simply a reflection of individuals’ sense of connectedness with others. Inevitably, that conclusion suggests that PSOC is not necessarily an antidote to some circumstances of alienation but rather a vehicle to avoid feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement across the political spectrum. As such, it can at times be socially problematic, especially when it undergirds identity politics, i.e. the tendency of people sharing a particular racial, religious, ethnic, social or cultural identity to form exclusionary alliances and/or engage in traditional broad-based party politics. Seemingly, PSOC can feed division, hatred and racism if, for example, white supremacists’ groups nurture PSOC as a response to their members’ perceptions of losing influence as demographic and economic changes surround them. Insofar as PSOC reflects our sense of belonging to the world around us, would erosions in that Sense compel efforts to deepen its roots and recapture its nostalgic intensity? We would note that Bowlby (1969) and Ainsworth and Bowlby (1991) argued that each of us has a driving force to belong, to be attached, connected and loved. When this need is not sufficiently met, might we become that person who struggles to hold on to familiar circumstances and connect with individuals linked to seemingly safer times, the values of our parents and their way of life? Might efforts of some to develop PSOC (e.g., recent immigrants or residents of mixed-income housing; LGBTQ individuals) threaten the existing PSOC of others (e.g. long-term residents of demographically changing neighborhoods)?

Sarason (1974) was perhaps among the earliest community psychologists to suggest that PSOC was a force for good (more than just a tool as McMillan (2011) contends and more than just the attachment instinct as Bowlby and Ainsworth suggest). A question for our discipline, therefore, is whether PSOC or related concepts can ease alienation across cultural and political impasses. Can our discipline bridge the divide between those feeling like they are losing life’s meaning and those who seek to gain acceptance into the larger social order? In effect, must some lose if others gain? The authors have struggled between themselves with this question, i.e., to what extent does participation in the social order have to be a zero-sum game?

In his reflections of community psychology and PSOC, Sarason (1974) questioned the potential of empowerment to reduce alienation. He refocused the conversation among community psychologists from PSOC to “Empowerment.” This was his primary answer to alienation. He contended that if everyone’s voice could be heard and everyone believed that they mattered, they would also feel more powerful and thereby less alienated. From this perspective, empowerment refers not just to an individual’s influence on the perspective or priorities of others but also to the responsibility to recognize, accept and respect the expression of the personal values, needs and wishes of others. Empowerment, in this sense, creates a basis for dialogue, understanding, and even perhaps negotiation but ideally, at least a respect for differing perspectives. Empowerment envisions circular influence and power flowing both ways from members to a community that listens to and respects the voices of members and members who listen to and respect the voices of other members and of community leaders. Respectful circular empowerment can discover creativity and avoid the compromise in the zero-sum game paradigm.

Forty-five years later Prilleltensky (2019) builds on the empowerment theme using its synonym “mattering” in place of Sarason’s (1974) version. To address morality in communities in his discussion of empowerment, Prilleltensky (2019) offered the term “mattering.” In our view, this term echoes Sarason’s concept of “Empowerment” and McMillan’s (1976, 1986, 1996, 2011) second element in PSOC, “Influence”. As we understand the concept, “mattering” generally means this: When one person matters to another, that person is moved by their feelings. “Moved” is the operative word here for it equates to feelings of a person having emotional, institutional, or physical power or influence over another. Ideally, all persons involved in persuasive discourse are open to being influenced by others. In this sense “to matter” or “be empowered” means that others are open to sharing your experiences, your feelings both positive and negative. Importantly, it means that others share responsibility for your well-being!

Mattering, however, can also become a tool for manipulating others. By offering or withholding the message that you “matter” to me or to the community, mattering can shape your behavior toward me and towards others. The notion of mattering can be one of the means by which one can appeal to individuals or segments of the population who feel disenfranchised by those deemed to be in control of the allocation of resources be they financial (e.g. some form of economic support), emotional (e.g. expressions of empathy and understanding) or simply commonality of victimization (e.g. your enemy is my enemy; but for “them” your needs would be met). This is McMillan’s second element of PSOC! Finding such a simplistic solution to the complex problem of alienation is what demagogues do as they use PSOC-based arguments to enlist others in their efforts to preserve the past. Simplifying complexity makes it easier to persuade and manipulate others. Conservative values described by Haidt are important and should be respected and integrated into the life of a community. Stating that does not imply that liberal/progressive values are any less important! Both the left and right are vulnerable to simplistic answers to complex questions to dichotomous paradigms of right and wrong instead of considered opinions which are formed by a search for effective win/win solutions.

As noted, our discussion brought us to mutual rejection of the view that power sharing inherently leads to a zero-sum outcome and with the view that increasing power in some does not necessarily reduce power in others! Rather we view the universe as capable of achieving expansions of wealth, knowledge and human compassion for all (Pinker, 2018). If we can expand the pie and use time as a third position (Newbrough, 1995; Newbrough et al, 2008), then we can make room for all of us to feel as if we matter. But if time stands still and if we assume a context of scarce resources where expansion and trade are not possible, then we enter a zero-sum game. The challenge for community psychologists is to find a way to invite those who fear social change to jump into the river of change, swim with the current and lose their fear! 

Mattering must go beyond the emotional to address material needs such as for employment, a living wage, respect in the workplace, a chance for the “American Dream” for people and especially for their kids. If this perspective is legitimate, it explains working-class, white folks and the Mid- American rural population’s attraction to a leader who says their fear of being disenfranchised is legitimate and promises to stop the tide of change! It also explains why those sharing these views must come together, recognize their common interests and together resist change by opposing all who embrace it! Readers may find the analysis appealing until they recognize that the same dynamic applies to many holding extreme progressive views!

Prilleltensky (2019) suggests that what members of the Black Lives Matter movement and the Me Too movement want is to “matter.” Admittedly, they want that but that’s not all they want. Human motivation doesn’t fit inside the one dimension of the lust for influence and recognition, (i.e., the desire to matter) any more than sex is the primary unconscious motive that Freud imagined it was. Prilleltensky (2019) envisions belonging (a sub-element of McMillan’s element #1, membership) as an aspect of mattering.

Thus, advocates of Black Lives Matter and Me Too also want some of the things that white supremacist want beyond mattering. They want to engage or participate or trade (McMillan’s element #3). They want to co-create and be a part of a transcendent story so that their lives have meaning (McMillan’s element #4). And yes, the border between having, for example, meaning (element #4) and mattering (McMillan’s element #2) is fuzzy. These two overlap, but they are also separate. African slaves mattered but in the practical/economic use of the term, matter, not in the emotional sense of the term. Their numbers were used to secure American debt in the Louisiana Purchase. They represented the wealth base of much of the South before the Civil War. The word “matter” does not begin to capture the essence of the motivation of the Black Lives Matter movement any more than “Power” or “Mattering” captures what those in the “Me Too” movement value. Women have power. They matter. They are valued as the builders of human nests, as mother’s to children and as sources of emotional support. They matter in many dimensions but, as reflected in this movement, not so much as individuals deserving of respect of their choices over their bodies!

It’s not just about power or mattering (McMillan’s element #2) it’s about the way they matter. Do they matter enough to have a seat at the table (McMillan’s element #1)? Do they deserve the respect as an equal trading partners in the exchange of goods, services, money and influence (McMillan’s element #3)? Can each individual use their strengths and talents to build a personal legend and leave a legacy for their progeny and can they be part of a community story in their music, dance, art and creativity (McMillan’s element #4, – again the concept of personal and community narratives)?

We return to the question that Marx and Seeman use alienation to answer is: What creates populist revolutions against the established order? The answer is not a simple person’s alienation, nor is it the strong angry emotion of hate. The answer to Marx’s question has more to do with the recipe for social movements. Most social scientist and social thinkers are not so concerned about social movements like the Magna Carta, or the American and French Revolutions or the movements that overthrew colonial governments in the eighteenth century.

Meriting further discussion is exploration of how social movements organized around hate are manipulated by demagogues. The climate crisis reminds us that we all, regardless of political affiliation and cultural identity are guests on what has been a relatively friendly planet.

Importantly, all are slowly beginning to recognize that we are in danger now. We all need the cooperation of everyone or our host planet will find a way to expel us. We need to create a story together for how we saved our species and protected our Mother Earth.


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Nowell, B. & Boyd, N. (2010). Viewing Community as Responsibility as Well as Resource: Deconstructing the Theoretical Roots of Psychological Sense of Community. Journal of Community Psychology, 38(7), 828-841.

Peterson, A., Speer, P., & McMillan, D.W. (2008). Validation of a brief sense of community scale: Confirmation of the principal theory of sense of community. Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 36, #1, 61-73.

Pinker, S. (2018). Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress. New York: Viking (Imprint of Penguin Random House).

Prilleltensky I. (2019). Mattering at the Intersection of Psychology, Philosophy and Politics. American Journal of Community Psychology.

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Sarason, S. B. (1949). Psychological problems in mental deficiency. Oxford, England: Harper.

Sarason, S.B. (1974). The psychological sense of community: Perspectives for community psychology. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sarason, S. B. (1988). The making of an American psychologist: An autobiography. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

____________________________

The authors thank Drs. Michael Blank, Douglas Perkins and Leonard Jason for sharing their thoughts about this commentary. All views presented are solely those of the authors.

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